How Democrats can win back the Latinos they lost to Trump

Sifting through the wreckage of the 2024 campaign, one thing that can’t be said about the Democrats is that they put too little effort into winning over Latino voters. If you looked closely, it was clear that the national party, the Biden-Harris campaign, and Democratic-allied groups were determined to avoid a repeat of 2020, when Joe Biden’s campaign was widely accused of neglecting Latino voters, starting its outreach too late, and making tone-deaf appeals — all mistakes that allowed Donald Trump to make historic gains with these communities despite Biden ultimately prevailing in the election. This time around, the Biden (and then Harris) campaign were determined to do everything right. They hired and elevated top Latino consultants, strategists, and elected officials. They opened field offices and hired staff in heavily Latino parts of swing states like Arizona, Georgia, Nevada, and Pennsylvania as early as the spring. They reached out to voters on WhatsApp, a private messaging app used as a form of social media by many Latino and immigrant communities; sent surrogates to Spanish-language radio stations; and microtargeted advertising to Puerto Rican, Dominican, and Mexican American voters. Spanish and bilingual ads ran continuously on TV, radio, and online starting in March. And those ads moved beyond an explicit focus on identity, instead talking up policy and accomplishments like Medicare’s cap on insulin prices, the expansion of health care coverage, and job creation during the post-Covid economic recovery. The hope was that this earlier, smarter, more tailored campaign would help reverse a few trends that were obvious for most of 2023 and 2024: that Latino voters were deeply unhappy with the status quo, were not enthusiastic about Biden’s reelection, and were questioning their loyalty to the Democratic Party. It’s clear now that this strategy was not enough. Though it will take months to get more granular data, county-level results and exit polls do indicate a rightward shift by Latino voters across the country that contributed to Trump’s victory. To be clear, it appears Democrats still won a majority of Latino voters — but the harsh reality for Democrats is that Trump once again managed to improve his standing. That doesn’t mean that Democrats should throw out the playbook for campaigning with Latino voters. Calls for a hard pivot to the right on cultural issues, or outright resignation about a permanent racial realignment — as some of the conventional wisdom floating around since the election suggests — are premature. Republicans simply cannot be sure these gains will stick around without Trump on the ballot. But there are oddly two contradictory takeaways given what we know so far: Democrats can assure themselves that they ran a pretty good campaign to win back Latino voter support. On a deeper level, however, they missed a more fundamental disconnect between the party and the voters, particularly the working class, that a textbook campaign simply couldn’t fix. Two takeaways from the election There are two distinct points to take away from November 5. First, campaigning does still matter. The national trend of Trump posting better margins of support in non-battleground states than in swing states applied to Latino voters as well. Where Democrats campaigned heavily for Latino votes, Harris saw a smaller drop in support than in places where her campaign did not focus its efforts — meaning that the campaign’s Latino ground game, spending, and organizing shouldn’t be discounted. The second point cuts the other way: There is a much deeper problem with Democrats’ appeal to Latino voters, one that will take time to repair. Nationally, Democrats like Biden and Harris were just not trusted as working-class champions by many Latino voters, who are still overwhelmingly working class and not college educated. The memories of economic hardship during the pandemic (for which Trump largely escaped blame) and the inflationary period that followed never went away, and weren’t properly addressed by either Biden or Harris during the campaign. Combined with an overriding anti-incumbent mood that permeated electorates globally this year, Democrats were almost certain to do worse with Latino voters. There were some exceptions. For example, Republican Senate candidate did not do as well as Trump did among Latino voters, and Democratic Rep. Ruben Gallego, who won the Arizona Senate race in a state Harris lost, particularly overperformed, winning by 2 percentage points a state that Trump won by 5. But the larger point holds: Democrats lost ground with Latino voters, and analysts point to their inability to appeal to the working class as a culprit. “It starts with the credibility of the message,” Chuck Rocha, a Mexican American strategist who advised Bernie Sanders’s 2020 primary campaign and helped with both Biden general election campaigns, told me. “People like to say that Bernie Sanders was this, or that — the thing that made Bernie Sanders great was that he had always said the same thing, so he was credible. People see bullshit now in politicians. They want someone that’s credible whether they like him or hate him.” Rebuilding that credibility will be essential if Democrats are to reverse their fortunes not just with Latino voters, but with a wide swathe of the electorate. Democrats never really figured out how to regain Latinos’ trust on the economy In retrospect, the storyline of the Latino electorate was fairly consistent. Poll after preelection poll told the same story: These voters were most concerned about the economy, and they were as likely as white voters to say they either missed the policies and economic conditions of the Trump era, or trusted Trump more than either Biden or Harris to deliver relief. At the heart of this feeling was a disconnect between what voters meant by “the economy” and what many national Democrats, including Biden and Harris, were talking about on the trail. Latino voters, troubled by inflation earlier in the Biden presidency, largely meant “prices should be lower,” while Biden and Harris mostly talked about job creation, slowing inflation, and gradually rising wages. That was true as early as November 2023, when polling from the Democratic research firm Blueprint found that Latino voters cared most about lower prices and least about “creating more jobs” — which was especially problematic because, as Blueprint also found, Latino voters more than any other racial group thought that more employment was Biden’s priority. Add to this dynamic the fact that it was Latino and Black Americans who experienced uniquely traumatizing financial roller-coasters during the post-Covid period — seeing their wealth and financial prospects rise during the pandemic because of government aid only for rising costs of living to wipe out many of those gains before wages began to grow again — and you can see where the Biden administration’s credibility gap emerged. The Biden economic message was focused on trying to sell a positive economic success story — and there were indeed data and legislation they could point to tell that story. But according to Camille Rivera, founder of the Puerto Rican civic organization La Brega y Fuerza, the campaign’s foregrounding of top-line indicators — the GDP, the improving consumer price index, the low unemployment rate, and investments in infrastructure and manufacturing, among others — could not sway voters who still saw vivid reminders of peak inflation in the cost of food and household essentials. “We were talking about the economy in macro forms, but people were not feeling it. They were just not feeling it,” Rivera said. “My father would be like, ‘Hey, did you see this? I just bought these potato chips. There’s like 50 percent air in these potato chips, and the price is higher.’ We kept saying, ‘But the economy is great. Look at the stock market!’ That to me was many of our flaws.” The “identity force-field” showed cracks Over time, this disconnect may have taken a toll on the overall “party of the working class” brand of the national Democratic Party. And there’s perhaps no better sign of this than in polling specifically focused on one dynamic that tends to bind Latinos to the Democratic Party: the question of which party best “cares for people like you.” It’s that feeling that has tended to root most Latino voters in the Democratic camp, even if these voters don’t necessarily agree with every social position, economic or immigration policy, or cultural value that the party takes on — a kind of “identity force-field,” as Equis, a Democratic research firm focused on Latino voters, calls it. In the aftermath of the 2022 midterms, Equis found evidence that those feelings were still fairly strong. In those midterms, there were conflicted or swing voters who turned out, and who, because of that warm association with the Democratic Party, pulled the lever for Democratic candidates. There were also Latino voters who ended up voting for Republicans — but who still harbored warm feelings toward Democrats anyway. Generally, Equis polling found, Democrats were still the party viewed as “better for Hispanics” and which cared “about people like you.” But as Carlos Odio, an Equis co-founder, warned at the time of that report, there was a good chance swing Latino voters could drift in 2024 if “there is a major shift in the issue environment, imbalanced campaigning, or a weakening of identity bonds.” And that seems to be what happened. The signs of weakening identity bonds were there. The Biden campaign fizzled out. And the economy, as well as a rise in the salience of immigration, put national Democrats on the defensive with both Latino voters and the general electorate. By October 2024, after Biden drove down positive perceptions of the party among Latinos prior to his late July exit, Harris had managed to recover the party’s footing. Her campaign strategy didn’t change tremendously, but polling showed Latino voters returning to the Democratic candidate, albeit not at the same rates that they had voted for Biden in 2020. By the close of the campaign, Harris was viewed as being “better for Hispanics” and “people like you.” But the Democratic advantage had shrunk from two years before. The force field was weak. And by then, it was too late for the Harris campaign. Democrats now face a challenge: to reassess how they talk about the economy, about class, and about material conditions in a way that can connect with the electorate. There’s a tendency among some in the party — strategists, commentators, and elected officials — to either want to throw out the way they’ve run outreach to Latino voters or to deny that they have a problem at all (and blame “disinformation” or offer counterintuitive data to bolster that thinking). Democratic campaign operations in 2024 were not useless, but if the party is to have a shot in 2028, the work to rebuild credibility with working-class Latinos starts now.